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The precautionary principle has been highly influential in legal systems all over the 
world. In its strongest and most distinctive forms, the principle imposes a burden of proof 
on those who create potential risks, and it requires regulation of activities even if it 
cannot be shown that those activities are likely to produce significant harms. Taken in 
this strong form, the precautionary principle should be rejected, not because it leads in 
bad directions, but because it leads in no directions at all. The principle is literally 
paralyzing— forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between. The 
reason is that in the relevant cases, every step, including inaction, creates a risk to 
health, the environment, or both. This point raises a further puzzle. Why is the 
precautionary principle widely seen to offer real guidance? The answer lies in 
identifiable cognitive mechanisms emphasized by behavioral economists. In many cases, 
loss aversion plays a large role, accompanied by a false belief that nature is benign. 
Sometimes the availability heuristic is at work. Probability neglect plays a role as well. 
Most often, those who use the precautionary principle fall victim to what might be called 
“system neglect,” which involves a failure to attend to the systemic effects of regulation. 
Examples are given from numerous areas, involving arsenic regulation, global warming 
and the Kyoto Protocol, nuclear power, pharmaceutical regulation, cloning, pesticide 
regulation, and genetic modification of food. The salutary moral and political goals of 
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All over the world, there is increasing interest in a simple idea for the regulation 
of risk: In case of doubt, follow the precautionary principle.
1 Avoid steps that will create 
a risk of harm. Until safety is established, be cautious; do not require unambiguous 
evidence. In a catchphrase: Better safe than sorry. In ordinary life, pleas of this kind seem 
quite sensible, indeed a part of ordinary human rationality. People buy smoke alarms and 
insurance. They wear seatbelts and motorcycle helmets, even if they are unlikely to be 
involved in an accident. Shouldn’t the same approach be followed by rational regulators 
as well? Many people believe so.
2 
 
A. Problems With Precautions 
 
I aim to challenge the precautionary principle here, not because it leads in bad 
directions, but because read for all that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. The 
principle threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction, and every step in 
between.
3 To explain this problem very briefly, the precautionary principle provides help 
only if we blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a 
narrow subset of what is at stake.
4 A significant part of my discussion will be devoted to 
showing why this is so. I will also urge that the precautionary principle gives the (false) 
appearance of being workable only because of identifiable cognitive mechanisms, which 
lead people to have a narrow rather than wide viewscreen. With that narrow viewscreen, 
it is possible to ignore, or to neglect, some of the risks that are actually at stake. I 
emphasize that we have good reason to endorse the goals that motivate many people to 
endorse the precautionary principle. These goals include the importance of protecting 
                                                 
1 See, for general discussion, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Tim O'Riordan and James Cameron 
eds. 2002); Protecting Public Health & the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 
(Carolyn Raffensberger & Joel Tickner eds. 1999). 
2 See the account of widespread international support below. 
3 For criticisms that also emphasize the range of risks at stake, but without stressing the paralyzing quality 
of the principle, see Wiener, supra note; Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle (2001).  
4 For discussion of the possibly perverse effects of the precautionary principle, see Frank B. Cross, 
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 851 (1996). I think that much of 
what Cross says is convincing, but my emphasis here is quite different: I stress the cognitive foundations of 
the principle and urge not that the principle leads in perverse directions but that it offers no guidance at all.  health and the environment even from remote risks; the need to attend to unintended 
adverse effects of technological change; and the need to ensure that wealthy countries 
pay their fair share for environmental improvement and risk reduction. But the 
precautionary principle is a crude way of protecting these goals, which should be pursued 
directly. I do not attempt to develop any particular replacement for the precautionary 
principle, but I do argue on behalf of wide viewscreens in the regulation of risks. 
 
In making these claims, I will be challenging an idea that has been a staple of 
regulatory policy for several decades.
5 Indeed, it has been claimed that the precautionary 
principle has become, or at least is becoming, a binding part of customary international 
law.
6 In the mid-1970s, German environmental policy was founded on the basis of 
Vorsorgeprinzip, a precursor of the precautionary principle.
7 With respect to risks, 
German policy has been described as seeing “precaution” as a highly interventionist idea, 
one that embodies “a loose and open-ended interpretation of precaution.”
8 In the United 
States, federal courts, without using the term explicitly, have built in a notion of 
precaution in some important cases, allowing or requiring regulation on the basis of 
conservative assumptions.
9 The precautionary principle has played a significant role in 
international documents, to the point where it has become ubiquitous. Variations on the 
notion can be found in at least fourteen international documents.
10 In 1982, the United 
                                                 
5 For helpful discussion, see David Freestone and Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the 
Precautionary Principle, in The Precautionary Principle and International Law 3 (David Freestone and 
Ellen Hey eds. 1994); Jonathan Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in The Risk Assessment of 
Environmental and Human Health Hazards (Dennis D. Paustenbach, ed., 2d ed., 2002, forthcoming).  
6 See O. McIntyre and T. Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International 
Law, 9 J Env Law 221 (1997); see generally Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary 
Principle in International Law (2002). 
7 Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Risk and the Precautionary Principle 1, 1 (Julian 
Morris ed. 2001). 
8 See Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (T. O’Riordan and J. Cameron eds. 1994). 
9 See, e.g., American Trucking Association v. EPA, F.3d (DC Cir 2002); Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 
1130 (DC Cir 1980). 
10 See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle 3 (2001). Indeed there appears to be a cascade effect 
here, with informational and reputational influences leading to many casual uses of the precautionary 
principle, to the point where a failure to incorporate the principle would seem to be a radical statement. 
Simply because the precautionary principle has been used so often, those involved in international 
agreements are likely to believe that it is probably sensible to use it yet again. And because so many people 
identify the precautionary principle with a serious commitment to environmental protection, see, e.g., 
Protecting Public Health & the Environment, supra note, any nation that rejects the principle risks incurring 
international opprobrium. For a general treatment of informational cascades, in which decisions by others Nations World Charter for Nature apparently gave the first international recognition to 
the principle, suggesting that when “potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the 
activities should not proceed.”
11 The closing Ministerial Declaration from the United 
Nations Economic Conference for Europe in 1990 asserts, “In order to achieve 
sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. . . . 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 




The widely publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of 
environmentalists in 1998, goes further still: “When an activity raises threats of harm to 
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the 
proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”
13 The 
European Union treaty states that on the environment, EU policy “shall be based on the 
precautionary principle.”
14 Notwithstanding official American ambivalence about the 
principle,
15 there are unmistakable echoes of the principle in American environmental 
law.
16 The precautionary principle has received a high-profile endorsement in the New 
York Times Magazine, which listed the principle as one of the most important ideas of 
2001.
17 In February 2002, the precautionary principle was explicitly adopted by the 
European Commission, together with implementing guidelines.
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
convey information about what it makes sense to do, see David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: 
Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188, 189 
(Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli eds 1995). On reputational pressures, see Timur Kuran, Public Lies, 
Private Truths (1996). 
11 Goklany, supra note, at 4. 
12 Id. at 5. 
13 Id. 
14 European Union Treaty, article 130R (1993), currently Article 174. 
15 See John Graham, The Role of Precaution and Risk Assessment in Risk Managament: An American’s 
View (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eu_speech.html; Wiener, supra note. 
16 Seethe reference to an “adequate margin of safety” in the Clean Air Act, section 109, 42 USC 7409(b(1). 
17 The Year in Ideas: A to Z, New York Times, December 9, 2001, p. 92, column 2.  
18 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press38_en.html In many ways the precautionary principle seems quite sensible, even appealing. 
To justify regulation, a certainty of harm should not be required; a risk, even a low one, 
may well be enough. It makes sense to expend resources to prevent a small chance of 
disaster; consider the high costs, pecuniary and otherwise, that are spent to reduce the risk 
of terrorist attack. On reasonable assumptions, these costs are worth incurring even if the 
probability of harm, in individual cases or even in the aggregate, is relatively low. The 
precautionary principle might well be seen as a plea for a kind of regulatory insurance. 
Certainly the principle might do some real-world good, spurring them to attend to 
neglected problems. Nonetheless, I will be urging that the principle cannot be fully 
defended in these ways, simply because risks are on all sides of social situations. Any 
effort to be universally precautionary will be paralyzing, forbidding every imaginable 
step, including no step at all. 
 
B. Precautions and Rationality 
 
But if the precautionary principle, taken in a strong form, is unhelpful, in a way 
literally senseless, how can we account for its extraordinary influence, and indeed for the 
widespread belief that it can and should guide regulatory judgments? I have mentioned its 
possible pragmatic value. And undoubtedly the principle is invoked strategically by self-
interested political actors, with European farmers, for example, invoking the idea of 
precaution to stifle American competitors, who are far more likely to rely on genetically 
modified crops.
19 But apart from this point, I suggest that an understanding of human 
rationality and cognition provides five useful clues.  
 
1. Loss  aversion. The precautionary principle often seems appealing because of loss 
aversion. The central point here is that people dislike losses far more than they 
like corresponding gains.
20 The result is that out-of-pocket costs, or deterioration 
from the status quo, seem much worse than opportunity costs, or benefits lost as a 
result of continuing the status quo. In the context of risks, people tend to focus on 
                                                 
19 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L Rev 683 
(1999). 
20 See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1995). the losses that are associated with some activity or hazard, and to disregard the 
gains that might be associated with that activity or hazard. The precautionary 
principle often becomes operational only because of loss aversion, as people take 
precautions against potential losses from the status quo, but neglect potential 
benefits that would be unmistakable gains. A closely related point is that 
unfamiliar risks produce far more concern than familiar ones, even if the latter are 
statistically larger; and the precautionary principle, in practice, is much affected 
by this fact.  
2.  The myth of a benevolent nature. Loss aversion is often accompanied by a 
mistaken belief that nature is essentially benign,
21 leading people to think that 
safety and health are generally at risk only or mostly as a result of human 
intervention. A belief in the relative safety of nature and the relative risk of new 
technologies often informs the precautionary principle. 
3.  The availability heuristic. It is well known that people focus on some risks simply 
because they are cognitively “available,” whereas other risks are not.
22 When the 
precautionary principle seems to require stringent controls on one risk, even 
though other risks are in the vicinity, the availability heuristic is a common 
reason. And when the availability heuristic is at work, certain hazards will stand 
out whether or not they are not statistically large.
 23 The hazards associated with 
heat waves, for example, receive little public attention, while the hazards 
associated with air travel are a significant source of public concern
24; one reason 
is that the latter hazards come readily to mind.  
4. Probability  neglect. People are sometimes prone to neglect the probability that a 
bad outcome will occur; they focus instead on the outcome itself.
25 The 
precautionary principle often embodies a form of probability neglect. At least this 
is so when people invoke the precautionary principle to favor stringent controls on 
                                                 
21 See generally James P. Collman, Naturally Dangerous (2001). 
22 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11-14 
(1982). 
23 Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 40 (2000). 
24 See Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (2002).  
25 Yuval Rottenstreich and Christopher Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective 
Psychology of Risk, 12 Psych Science 185, 188 (2001). a low-probability risk, when the consequence of those very controls is to give rise 
to new risks of equal or greater probability.
26 
5. System  neglect. The precautionary principle often reflects a general neglect of the 
systemic effects of regulation.
27 When a single problem is placed in view, it can 
be difficult to see the full consequences of legal interventions. Sometimes the 
precautionary principle has the appearance of being workable only because a 
subset of the relevant effects are “on screen”—and hence there seems to be no 
need to take precautions against other possible adverse effects, also involving 
health and safety, that do not register. An important aspect of system neglect is 
tradeoff neglect, one source of the conflict between experts and ordinary people in 
thinking about risks.
28 When experts disagree with ordinary people about risks, it 
is sometimes because experts look at both the benefits and the harms associated 
with the relevant practice, whereas ordinary people are paying attention to the 
harms but not the benefits.
29 I suggest that the precautionary principle seems 
appealing, to ordinary people, in large part for the same reason. 
 
One of my major goals is show that the precautionary principle can be made 
workable only through routes of this kind. An understanding of behavioral economics 
simultaneously sheds light on the operation of the principle, explains its otherwise 
puzzling appeal, and suggests why it should be abandoned or at least substantially recast. 
Indeed, such an understanding provides a better understanding of the uses and pitfalls of 
the old adage, “better safe than sorry,” which is subject to many of the same objections as 
the precautionary principle. I do not attempt to identify a competing principle for 
adoption by sensible regulators. But I do urge that such regulators should use a wide 
rather than narrow viewscreen—and that as applied, the precautionary principle is 
defective precisely because it runs afoul of this idea. To be sure, many of those who 
endorse the principle seek to protect against neglect of the future, disregard of the 
                                                 
26 In some cases, this is a reasonable reading of the evidence governing genetically modified food. See Alan 
McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket 230-42 (2000); note in particular the evidence of harms from organic 
foods, discussed in id. 
27 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure 6-42 (1996). 
28 The conflict is treated in Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2000). 
29 See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1996). interests of those suffering from the greatest deprivation, and impossible demands for 
unambiguous evidence from regulators. But as we shall see, the precautionary principle is 
a crude and sometimes perverse way of promoting those goals, which can be obtained 
through other, better routes. A major purpose of this Essay is to suggest the need to use 
more direct effective strategies to pursue the salutary goals of risk regulation. 
 
This Article comes in four parts. Part I briefly traces the nature and the appeal of 
the precautionary principle. Part II explains why the principle is paralyzing, with 
particular reference to the issues raised by arsenic, global warming, nuclear power, and 
genetic engineering of food. Part III suggests that the apparent sense of the principle is 
best understood in light of the behavioral points just mentioned. Part IV is a brief 
conclusion, in the form of a plea for wider viewscreens. 
 
II. The Precautionary Principle: Definition and Appeal 
 
I have said that the precautionary principle enjoys widespread international 
support.
30 But what does the principle mean or require? There are numerous definitions, 
and they are not compatible with one another.
31 We can imagine a continuum of 
understandings. At one extreme are weak versions to which no reasonable person could 
object; at the other extreme are strong versions that would appear to call for a 
fundamental rethinking of regulatory policy.  
 
The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a lack of 
decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate. Regulation 
might be justified even if we cannot establish a definite connection between, for example, 
low-level exposures to certain carcinogens and adverse effects on human health. Thus the 
1992 Rio Declaration states, “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
                                                 
30 See Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (2002). 
31 See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Risk and the Precautionary Principle, supra, 
at 1-19; Wiener, supra note. measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
32 The Ministerial Declaration of the 
Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, held in London in 
1987, is in the same vein: “Accepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly 
damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary principle is 
necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a 
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.”
33 Similarly, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change offers cautious language: 
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account 
that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”
34  
 
 The Wingspread Declaration goes somewhat further: “When an activity raises 
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be 
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. 
In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden 
of proof.”
35 The first sentence just quoted is a mildly more aggressive version of the 
statement from the Rio Declaration. It is more aggressive because it is not limited to 
threats of serious or irreversible damage. But in reversing the burden of proof, the second 
sentence goes further still.
36 Of course everything depends on what those with the burden 
of proof must show in particular.  
 
In Europe, the precautionary principle is understood in a still stronger way, 
suggesting that it is important to build “a margin of safety into all decision making.”
37 
According to one definition, the precautionary principle means “that action should be 
taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the 
                                                 
32 Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (2001). 
33 Quoted in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 3, Julian Morris ed. (2000). 
34 See Goklany, supra note, at 6. 
35 See http://www.monitor.net/rachel/r586.html 
36 See the discussion in Wiener, supra note; David Pearce, The Preconditions for Achieving Consensus in 
the Context of Technological Risk, in Technological Risk: Its Perception and Handling in the European 
Community (M. Dierkes et al. eds 1980). 
37 See Bjorn Lomborg The Skeptical Environmentalist 348 (2001). harm has already occurred.”
38 In a comparably strong version, it is said that “the 
precautionary principle mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or 
environmental damage to others or to future generations, and when there is scientific 
uncertainty as to the nature of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions 
should be made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until 
scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur.”
39 The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 2000, appears to adopt a 
strong version as well.
40 The Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” 
conference says that if “the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain activity is serious enough 




Professor Richard Stewart usefully distinguishes among four different versions of 
the precautionary principle, capturing both weak and strong types
42; I paraphrase his 
typology here: 
 
1. Nonpreclusion Precautionary Principle: Regulation should not be precluded by the 
absence of scientific uncertainty about activities that pose a risk of substantial harm. 
 
2. Margin of Safety Precautionary Principle: Regulation should include a margin of 
safety, limiting activities below the level at which adverse effects have not been 
found or predicted. 
 
3. Best Available Technology Precautionary Principle: Best available technology 
requirements should be imposed on activities that pose an uncertain potential to create 
substantial harm, unless those in favor of those activities can show that they present 
no appreciable risk. 
                                                 
38 http://www.logophilia.com/WordSpy/precautionaryprinciple.asp 
39 Testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth, before the Senate Appropriate 
Committee, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services (Jan. 24, 2002). 
40 See Goklany, supra note, at 6. 
41 Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” Conference, Annex 1, Copenhagen, 1994. 
42 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 20 Research in Law 
and Economics 71, 76 (2002).  
4. Prohibitory Precautionary Principle: Prohibitions should be imposed on activities 
that have an uncertain potential to impose substantial harm, unless those in favor of 
those activities can show that they present no appreciable risk.  
 
This account shows that the precautionary principle might be described both in 
terms of the level of uncertainty that triggers a regulatory response and in terms of the 
tool that will be chosen in the face of uncertainty (as in the case of technological 
requirements or prohibitions). With an appreciation of this point, we can easily imagine 
many other variations on these themes. For example, an Information Disclosure 
Precautionary Principle might say that in the face of uncertainty, those who subject 
people to potential risks must disclose relevant information to those so subjected. The 
debate over labeling genetically modified organism can be seen as a debate over this form 
of the precautionary principle.
43 For every regulatory tool, there is a corresponding 
precautionary principle,
44 with possible matches or mismatches between the problem that 
causes for precautions and the chosen tool.
45 The idea of “margin of safety” can be 
understood in multiple different ways, with a continuum from a small margin, designed 
to counteract likely risks, to a small one, designed to prevent worst cases. 
 
The official account in Europe is very much in favor of one or another version of 
the precautionary principle, with the European Commission having formally adopted it.
46 
But European practice is far more complex, with the precautionary principle being 
invoked against some risks but not against others.
47 To take just one example, “Europe 
has been more precautionary about hormones in beef, while the US has been more 
precautionary about mad cow disease (BSE) in beef and blood donations.”
48 While 
                                                 
43 See Alan McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket 201-29 (2000). 
44 For discussions of regulatory tools, see Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 36-183 (1982); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 251-88 (2002). 
45 On mismatch, see Breyer, supra, at 191-96. 
46 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM 
(200)!, Brussels, 2 Feb. 2000 (available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub7_en.pdf 
47 See the illuminating discussion in Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the 
United States and Europe, 5 J Risk Research 317 (2002). 
48 Id. at 323. European nations have taken a highly precautionary approach to genetically modified 
foods,
49 the United States has been especially willing to control the risks associated with 
carcinogens in food additives.
50 In the context of occupational risk, American law is far 
more precautionary than Swedish law.
51 I cannot venture a survey here, but it is 
reasonable to speculate that in actual practice, nations cannot plausibly be ranked along 
some continuum of precaution. More plausibly, some nations are precautionary about 
some risks but not others, and a general adoption of the precautionary principle will 
conceal this inevitable fact.
52 I will return to this point and to its inevitability below, 
because it is closely connected to my central claims here. Nonetheless, the mounting 
importance of the principle in Europe deserves close attention, if only because the idea of 
precaution is playing such a large role in public debates.  
 
I have suggested that the weak versions of the precautionary principle are 
unobjectionable and important. Every day, people take steps (and incur costs) to avoid 
hazards that are far from certain. We do not walk in moderately dangerous areas at night; 
we exercise; we buy smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty 
foods. Sensible governments are willing to consider regulation of risks that, in individual 
cases or even in the aggregate, have a well under 100% chance of coming to fruition. The 
weak versions of the precautionary principle state a truism—uncontroversial and 
necessary only to combat public confusion or the self-interested claims of private groups 
demanding unambiguous evidence of harm, which no rational society requires. This 
function should not be trivialized. Nearly a fifth of Americans, for example, recently 
agreed that “until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take 
                                                 
49 See David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: A Case-Study of 
Contemporary European Regulatory Politics (Publication of the Study Group on Trade, Science and 
Genetically Modified Foods, 2001), available at http://www.cfr.org/pubs/Victor_ModFood_Paper2.html; 
Symposium, Are the US and Europe Heading for a Food Fight Over Genetically Modified Food? (2001), 
available at http://pewagbiotech.org/events/1024/; TonyGilland, Precaution, GM Crops, and Farmland 
Birds, in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 84, 84-88 (Julian Morris ed. 2001). 
50 See Richard Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice 
or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1988). 
51 See Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational 
Safety and Health Policy (1981). 
52 See Wiener and Rogers, supra note. any steps that would have economic costs.”
53 Sometimes people do seem to seek 
certainty before showing a willingness to expend costs, and well-organized private 
groups like to exploit this fact. Insofar as the precautionary principle counteracts the 
tendency to demand certainty, it should be approved. 
 
Because the weak versions are sensible, I will not discuss them here. Instead I will 
understand the principle in a strong way, to suggest that regulation is required whenever 
there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting 
evidence is speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high. To avoid 
palpable absurdity, the idea of “possible risk” will be understood to require a certain 
threshold of scientific plausibility. To support regulation, no one thinks that it is enough 
if someone, somewhere, urges that a risk is worth taking seriously. But under the 
precautionary principle as I shall understand it, the threshold burden is minimal, and once 
it is met, there is something like a presumption in favor of stringent regulatory controls. I 
believe that this understanding of the precautionary principle fits with the understandings 
of its most enthusiastic proponents,
54 and that with relatively modest variations, this 
understanding fits with many of the legal formulations as well.
55 
 
Why might the precautionary principle, understood in this strong sense, have such 
widespread appeal? At first glance, the answer is simple, for the principle contains some 
important truth. Sometimes it is much better to be safe than sorry. Certainly we should 
acknowledge that a small probability (say, 1 in 100,000) of a serious harm (say, 100,000 
deaths) deserves extremely serious attention. It is worthwhile to spend a lot of money to 
eliminate that risk. The fact that a danger is unlikely to materialize is hardly a decisive 
objection to regulatory controls. Now an economically oriented critic might observe that 
our resources are limited and that if we spend large amounts of resources on highly 
speculative harms, we will not be allocating those resources wisely. In fact this is the 
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Estuarine and Coastal Law 23, 26 (1990). simplest criticism of the precautionary principle.
56 Unless the harm would be truly 
catastrophic, a huge investment makes no sense for a harm that has a 1 in 1 billion chance 
of occurring. Taken for all that it is worth, the precautionary principle might seem to 
require indefensibly huge expenditures, exhausting our budget well before the menu of 
options could be thoroughly consulted.
57 If we take costly steps to address all risks, 
however improbable they are, we will quickly impoverish ourselves. On this view, the 
principle “would make for a dim future.”
58 This is no less true for nations than for 
individuals.  
 
Some version of this argument is surely convincing, but it also seems to be 
missing something about human cognition.
59 In some contexts, regulation is indeed a 
form of insurance, or a way of placing special locks on a door. Consider the following 
choice. Would you rather have 
 
1.  A sure loss of $20, or 
2.  A 1% chance of losing $1980? 
 
In terms of expected value, (b), representing a statistical loss of $19.80, is a bit 
less bad than (a); but most people would gladly choose the sure loss of $20.
60 People do 
not like to run a small risk of a large or catastrophic loss; this is why people buy 
insurance and take special precautions against serious harms, even in circumstances in 
which an analysis of expected value would not justify these steps.
61 If government 
follows the judgments of ordinary people, it will be risk-averse in this sense as well. The 
willingness to incur sure losses, in preference to low-probability catastrophes of lower 
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58 See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Risk and the Precautionary Principle, supra, 
at 1, 17. 
59 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in 
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Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000). expected value, helps explain decisions in a variety of domains, involving both law and 
politics, including foreign policy.
62 
 
This point about judgment under risk might seem to suggest that a democratic 
society, following popular views, will depart from the predictions of expected utility 
theory and even embody a form of risk aversion for low-probability catastrophes.
63 The 
result will be to move regulation in the direction suggested by the precautionary 
principle. But prospect theory cannot provide a defense of the principle in its strong form. 
I now explain why this is so. 
 
1.  Why the Precautionary Principle Is Paralyzing 
 
A. The Problem 
 
The most serious problem with the precautionary principle is that it offers no 
guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including inaction. 
To understand this point, it will be useful to anchor the discussion in some concrete 
problems: 
 
1.  One of the most controversial environmental issues faced in the first year of 
the Bush administration involved the regulation of arsenic.
64 There is a serious 
dispute over the precise level of risks posed by low levels of arsenic in 
drinking water, but on the “worst case” scenario, over one hundred lives might 
be lost each year as a result of the 50 part per billion standard that the Clinton 
Administration sought to revise.
65 At the same time, the proposed 10 ppb 
                                                 
62 See id; Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign 
Policy (1998). 
63 See Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. 
Legal Stud. 747 (1990). 
64 Robert K. Musil, Arsenic on Tap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A18. 
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, Geo. L. J. (forthcoming 2002). standard would cost over $200 million each year, and it is possible that it 
would save as few as six lives annually.
66 
2.  Genetic modification of food has become a widespread practice.
67 But the 
risks of that practice are not known with precision.
68 Some people fear that 
genetic modification will result in serious ecological harm and large risks to 
human health.
69 
3. Scientists are not in accord about the dangers associated with global 
warming,
70 but there is general agreement that global warming is in fact 
occurring.
71 It is possible that global warming will produce, by 2100, a mean 
temperature increase of 4.5 degrees C
72; that it will result in well over $5 
trillion in annual monetized costs
73; and that it will also produce a significant 
number of deaths from malaria. The Kyoto Protocol would require most 
industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 92%-94% of 
1990 levels.
74 
4.  Many people fear nuclear power, on the ground that nuclear power plants 
raise various health and safety issues, including some possibility of 
catastrophe.
75 But if a nation does not rely on nuclear power, it is likely to rely 
instead on fossil fuels, and in particular on coal-fired power plants.
76 Such 
plants create risks of their own, including risks associated with global 
warming. China, for example, has relied on nuclear energy in part as a way of 
reducing greenhouse gases and in part as a way of reducing other air pollution 
problems.
77 
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L. Rev. 493 (2000). Of course it is possible to urge that nations should reduce reliance on either coal-fired 5.  There is a possible conflict between the protection of marine mammals and 
military exercises. The United States Navy, for example, engages in many 
such exercises, and it is possible that marine mammals will be threatened as a 
result. Military activities in the oceans might well cause significant harm; but 
a decision to suspend those activities, in cases involving potential harm, might 
also endanger military preparedness.
78 
 
In these cases, what kind of guidance is provided by the precautionary principle? 
It is tempting to say, as is in fact standard, that the principle calls for strong controls on 
arsenic, on genetic engineering of food, on greenhouse gases, on threats to marine 
mammals, and on nuclear power.
79 In all of these cases, there is a possibility of serious 
harms, and no authoritative scientific evidence suggests that the possibility is close to 
zero. If the burden of proof is on the proponent of the activity or processes in question, 
the precautionary principle would seem to impose a burden of proof that cannot be met. 
Put to one side the question whether the precautionary principle, understood to compel 
stringent regulation in these cases, is sensible. Let us ask a more fundamental question: Is 
that more stringent regulation therefore compelled by the precautionary principle? 
 
The answer is that it is not. In some of these cases, it should be easy to see that in 
its own way, stringent regulation would actually run afoul of the precautionary principle. 
The simplest reason is that such regulation might well deprive society of significant 
benefits, and for that reason produce a large number of deaths that would otherwise not 
occur. In some cases, regulation eliminates the “opportunity benefits” of a process or 
activity, and thus causes preventable deaths.
80 If this is so, regulation is hardly 
precautionary. The most familiar cases involve the “drug lag,” produced by a highly 
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78 See Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Readiness and 
Logistics, before the Committee on House Resources, Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife 
and Oceans (June 13, 2002). 
79 See http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Produits/dpenv/som-ec43.html. 
80 See Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (1994). precautionary approach to the introduction of new medicines and drugs into the market.
81 
If a government takes such an approach, it might protect people against harms from 
inadequately tested drugs; but it will also prevent people from receiving potential beneits 
from those very drugs.
82 Is it “precautionary” to require extensive premarketing testing, 
or to do the opposite?  
 
Or consider the case of genetic modification of food. Many people believe that a 
failure to allow genetic modification might well result in numerous deaths, and a small 
probability of many more.
83 The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise 
of producing food that is both cheaper and healthier—resulting, for example, in “golden 
rice,” which might have large benefits in developing countries.
84 Now the point is not that 
genetic modification will definitely have those benefits, or that the benefits of genetic 
modification outweigh the risks. The point is only that if the precautionary principle is 
taken literally, it is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation. So too for 
regulation of ground-level ozone. Such regulation does seem justified by the 
precautionary principle, for responsible people believe that low levels of ozone produce a 
range of health harms, including risks of death.
85 But there is also evidence that ground-
level ozone produces health benefits, by reducing risks of cataracts and skin cancer.
 86 
Because the precautionary principle calls for protection when causal connections are 
unclear, it would appear to require, with respect to ground-level ozone, both stringent 
regulation and no regulation at all. 
 
Sometimes regulation would violate the precautionary principle because it would 
give rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that materialize, or are increased, as a 
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86 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1052 (DC Cir 1999).  result of regulation.
87 Consider the case of nuclear power. It is reasonable to think that in 
light of current options, a ban on nuclear power will increase dependence on fossil 
fuels,
88 which contribute to global warming. If so, such a ban would seem to run afoul of 
the precautionary principle. Or consider the EPA’s effort to ban asbestos,
89 a ban that 
might well seem justified or even compelled by the precautionary principle. The 
difficulty, from the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also 
carry risks.
90 Or return to possible risks to marine mammals from the United States Navy. 
Some people are concerned that efforts to eliminate those risks will endanger military 
preparedness, if only because of administrative barriers to training exercises.
91 In these 
circumstances, what is the appropriate approach, according to the precautionary 
principle? 
 
The problem is pervasive. In the case of arsenic, the Administrator of the EPA has 
expressed concern that regulation, by virtue of its cost, will lead people to cease using 
local water systems and to rely on private wells, which have high levels of 
contamination.
92 If this is so, stringent arsenic regulation violates the precautionary 
principle, no less than less stringent regulation does. This is a common situation, for 
opportunity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the exception.
93 
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targeted. For a valuable discussion, see Richard Revesz, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2002). It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility 
that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health.
 94 To be sure, 
both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are disputed.
 95 It has been urged 
that a statistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7 million
96; it has also been 
estimated that the requisite expenditure, for a loss of life, is $50 million
97; and one of the 
most careful studies suggests a cutoff point, for a loss of life per regulatory expenditure, 
of $15 million.
98 A striking study suggests that poor people are especially vulnerable to 
this effect—that a regulation that reduces wealth for the poorest 20% of the population 
will have twice as large a mortality effect as a regulation that reduces wealth for the 
wealthiest 20%.
99 I do not mean to accept any particular amount here, or even to suggest 
that there has been an unambiguous demonstration of an association between mortality 
and regulatory expenditures.
100 The only point is that reasonable people believe in that 
association. It follow that a multimillion dollar expenditure for “precaution” has—as a 
worst case scenario—significant adverse health effects, with an expenditure of $200 
million as leading to perhaps as many as thirty to forty lives lost.  
 
This point makes the precautionary principle hard to implement not merely where 
regulation removes “opportunity benefits,” or introduces or increases substitute risks, but 
also in any case in which the regulation costs a significant amount. If this is so, the 
precautionary principle, for that very reason, seems to argue against many regulations. If 
the precautionary principle argues against any action that carries a small risk of 
significant harm, then we should be reluctant to spend a lot of money to reduce risks, 
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from the cost of regulation are possible but unlikely). simply because those expenditures themselves carry risks. Here is the sense in which, the 
precautionary principle, taken for all that it is worth, is paralyzing: It stands as an 
obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything in between. To say this is not 
to say that the precautionary principle cannot be amended in a way that removes the 
problem.
101 But once it is so amended, it is much less distinctive, and increasingly 
resembles an effort to weight the health benefits or regulation against the health costs,
102 
or even to measure benefits against costs. I will return to this point below. 
 
It is now easier to understand the earlier suggestion that despite its formal 
enthusiasm for the precautionary principle, European nations are not “more 
precautionary” than the United States. Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers have 
demonstrated this point empirically.
103 It would be most valuable to attempt to 
comparative study, to see which nations are especially precautionary with respect to 
which risks, and also to explore changes over time. In the early twenty-first century, for 
example, the United States appears to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks 
associated with abandoned hazardous waste dumps,
104 terrorism, and the provision of 
universal health care, but not to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks 
associated with global warming,
105 indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and obesity. 
What I have been urging is that the selectivity of precautions is not merely an empirical 
fact; it is a conceptual inevitability. Simply as a logical matter, no society can be highly 
precautionary with respect to all risks.  
 
B. Rejoinders, Adjustments, and Salutary Goals 
 
Is there anything that might be said, at this stage, by proponents of the 
precautionary principle? There are several possibilities. 
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105 For the current responses, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html 1. The weak version. It might be tempting to revert to the weak version of the 
principle—a version that is entirely unobjectionable. Alternatively, it might be urged that 
in many cases in which the principle is invoked, the risk at issue is the one that deserves 
the most sustained attention. In the context of global warming, for example, the 
precautionary principle might be triggered on the ground that the potential risks of 
warming are far greater than the risks associated with the reduction of greenhouse gases. 
But this step points toward a sensible and substantial refashioning of the principle, one 
that ensures that low-probability catastrophes are given careful attention, and that the 
various risks at issue will be weighed and balanced in accordance with the facts.  
 
2.. Biases. In addition, advocates of the precautionary principle might urge that 
environmental values are systematically disregarded in the regulatory process, or not 
given their due, and hence that the principle helps counteract systematic biases.
106 A 
particular problem here is myopia
107: Perhaps government officials, uninformed by the 
precautionary principle, would fail to attend to risks that will not occur, or be seen to 
occur, in the short-run. Another problem is that people tend to be unrealistically 
optimistic.
108 As a result, many low-level risks do not register at all. A related problem is 
that people tend to reduce cognitive dissonance, sometimes by treating risks as if they are 
tiny, even worth ignoring.
109 When people think that they are “safe,” even though they 
face a statistical risk, they might well be responding to emotions, seeking to avoid the 
anxiety that comes from an understanding of the inevitability of risk.  
 
On this view, the principle can be defended pragmatically, if not theoretically, as 
a way of emphasizing the importance of attending to issues, especially environmental 
issues, that might otherwise be neglected. In some settings, the pragmatic defense is 
undoubtedly plausible, and the precautionary principle, applied with a narrow 
viewscreen, undoubtedly leads to some good results. But two problems remain. The first 
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George Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales 123, 124-28 (1984).  is that environmental values are sometimes on both sides of the controversy; consider the 
nuclear power controversy. The same is certainly true of health and safety, as shown by 
the case of premarket testing of pharmaceuticals. The second is that even when 
environmental values are on only one side, the interests and values on the other side 
might well be at a comparative disadvantage too; consider the potential beneficiaries of 
genetic modification of food. In short, a more modest and revised precautionary principle 
might well make sense, but the less modest, and more distinctive, principle is hard to 
defend. 
 
3. Distribution. It is also possible to defend the precautionary principle on 
distributional grounds. The Clean Air Act takes a precautionary approach, requiring an 
“adequate margin of safety” and hence regulation in the fact of scientific uncertainty.
110 
At the same time, the Clean Air Act appears to be giving disproportionate benefits to 
poor people and members of minority groups.
111 Aggressive action to combat climate 
change would be more beneficial to poor countries than to wealthy ones.
112 This is partly 
because wealthy countries are better able to adapt; it is partly because agriculture, 
potentially vulnerable to climate change, is responsible for only 2% of the economy of 
wealthy nations, but 50% of the economy of poor nations
113; it is partly because one of 
the most serious health risks posed by climate change consists of an increased incidence 
of malaria, a nonproblem for wealthy countries.
114 In the context of global warming, at 
least, the precautionary principle might be invoked to prevent especially severe burdens 
on those in the worst position to bear them. 
 
Of course it makes sense to be concerned with the distribution of domestic or 
international risks. The problem of global warming owes its origin to the actions of 
wealthy nations, and hence it makes special sense to ask those nations to bear a 
disproportionate cost of correction if poor nations are likely to be hit hardest. The 
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114 See sources cited in note 87 supra.  distributional effects of global warming are among the strongest points in favor 
aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases.
115 But in many cases, the precautionary 
principle, as applied, would threaten to have unfortunate distributional effects. The case 
of genetic modification of food is an example; here the benefits are likely to be enjoyed 
by poor people, not the wealthy.
116 The case of DDT is similar. While a ban on DDT, 
supported by reference to the precautionary principle, is eminently justified in wealthy 
nations, such a ban is likely to have bad effects in at least some poor countries, where 
DDT is the cheapest and most effective way of combating serious diseases, most notably 
malaria.
117 Distributional issues should indeed be a part of a system of risk regulation, but 
the precautionary principle is a crude, indirect, and sometimes perverse way of 
incorporating distributional concerns. 
 
4. Risk vs. uncertainty. A more subtle point is possible. Often regulators, and 
ordinary people, are acting in a situation of risk (where probabilities can be assigned to 
various outcomes) rather than uncertainty (where no such probabilities can be 
assigned).
118 Thus far I have been speaking as if environmental and other risk-related 
problems involved a risks of ascertainable probability—so that analysts are able to say 
that the risk of X number of deaths in Y percent, whereas the risk of 2X number of deaths 
is Y/n, and so forth. But we can imagine instances in which analysts cannot specify even 




In a situation of uncertainty, when existing knowledge does not permit regulators 
to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is standard to follow the maximin principle: Choose 
the policy with the best worst-case outcome.
120 Perhaps the precautionary principle, as 
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120 See Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 185-207 (1983), for a helpful discussion. applied, is a form of the maximin principle, asking officials to identify the worst case 
among the various options, and to select that option whose worst-case is least bad. 
Perhaps the maximin principle would support many proposed applications of the 
precautionary principle, by, for example, urging aggressive steps to combat global 
warming.  
 
This is not an implausible suggestion; sometimes it is best to respond to the worst-
case scenario, as some governments do in the face of risks to national security (not 
excluding those risks posed by terrorism). But the response faces three problems. The 
first is that the precautionary principle is not the maximin principle, and if the latter 
principle is what is meant, then we should be discussing that principle directly, and 
evaluating it against the alternatives. The precautionary principle obscures those issues. 
The second problem is that so defended, the principle might well prevent rational 
priority-setting, simply because it “leads to a disproportionate allocation of limited 
regulatory priorities to those activities posing relatively more uncertainty, because the 
worst case assumption inflates their harm value relative to risks that are better 
characterized.”
121 The third problem is that risks that are now in the realm of uncertainty 
will often move, over time, into the realm of risk. Indeed, one of the principal goals of a 
well-functioning system of environmental protection is to acquire more information about 
potential hazards, information that includes an understanding of the probability of harm. 
In some circumstances, acquiring information is far better than responding to the worst-




  5. Salutary goals. We are now in a position to appreciate some of the goals of 
those who invoke the precautionary principle. Serious environmental problems might be 
addressed too late, or not at all, simply because causal connections cannot be described 
with certainty. In the context of tobacco, for example, a serious public health movement 
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122 See id. at 106-112. was muted simply by virtue of scientific doubt
123—even though reasonable people take 
steps to reduce likelihoods, not only certainties, of adverse effects. The precautionary 
principle can be taken as a reminder not to require proof. To the extent that the 
precautionary principle is a reminder of obligations to the future, it is entirely salutary. 
Those who invoke the principle undoubtedly are motivated, much of the time, by the goal 
of protecting the most vulnerable people against risks to their safety and health.
124 On this 
view, the precautionary principle has strong moral goals, and they are distributive in 
character.  
 
Nothing I have said is meant to draw these goals into doubt. My claim is that the 
precautionary principle is a crude and sometimes perverse way of promoting the relevant 
goals—and that if it is taken seriously, it is paralyzing, and therefore not helpful at all. 
 
IV. The Operation of the Precautionary Principle: A Behavioral Account 
 
  In practice, the precautionary principle is widely thought to provide concrete 
guidance.
125 How can this be? I suggest that the principle becomes operational if and only 
if those who apply it wear blinders—only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the 
regulatory situation but downplay or disregard others. Consider, for example, those who 
think that the precautionary principle requires restrictions on genetic engineering of food; 
to have this belief, it is necessary to ignore the potential health benefits of the practice. Or 
consider those who think that the precautionary principle calls for stringent regulation of 
greenhouse gases; such people neglect the need to adopt precautions against the very 
risks introduced by stringent regulation. In the same vein, those who invoke the 
precautionary principle to seek regulation of human cloning neglect the possibility that 
without therapeutic cloning, many people will die.
126  
 
                                                 
123 See Robert Goodin, No Smoking (1985). 
124 See note 1 supra. 
125 See, e.g., Implementing the Precautionary Principle, supra note. 
126 See Testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, supra note. But these points simply raise an additional question: Why is the precautionary 
principle so influential? Why does it speak to so many people? I believe that much of the 
answer lies in an understanding of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. Five 
points are especially pertinent. Taken together, they help explain the kinds of blinders 
that people wear when they use the precautionary principle to support concrete outcomes. 
The points help show the sense in which the relevant blinders are not arbitrary or 
coincidental. They have some unmistakable structure. 
 
A.  Loss Aversion and Familiarity 
 
1. In general. People tend to be loss averse, which means that a loss from the 
status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desirable.
127 To see how loss 
aversion works, consider some of the classic experiments, which involve the endowment 
effect.
128 People who were initially endowed with certain goods—such as coffee mugs, 
chocolate bars, and binoculars—valued those goods far more than those who were not 
initially endowed with them. The reason for the endowment effect is loss aversion
129: 
People are much more distressed by the prospect of loss than they are pleased by the 
prospect of equivalent gain. Another way to put the point is to say that contrary to 
economic theory, people do not value out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs the same. 
Opportunity costs, as foregone gains, seem to be far less bad, on a per-dollar basis, than 
out-of-pocket costs. 
 
In the context of risk regulation, there is a clear implication: People will be 
closely attuned to the losses produced by any newly introduced risk, or any aggravation 
of existing risks, but far less concerned with the benefits that are foregone as a result of 
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129 Of course loss aversion itself remains to be explained. For relevant discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Switching the Default Rule, NYU L Rev (forthcoming 2002). regulation. I believe that loss aversion helps to explain what makes the precautionary 
principle operational: The opportunity costs of regulation often register little or not at all, 
whereas the out-of-pocket costs of the activity or substance in question are entirely 
visible. In fact this is a form of status quo bias.
130 The status quo marks the baseline 
against which gains and losses are measured, and a loss from the status quo seems much 
more bad than a gain from the status quo seems good.  
 
If loss aversion is at work, we would predict that the precautionary principle 
would place a spotlight on the losses introduced by some risk, and downplay the benefits 
foregone as a result of controls. In fact this is what we have observed in several 
contexts.
131 Whenever the “opportunity benefits” are off-screen, this will be the reason 
that the precautionary principle appears to give guidance notwithstanding the objections I 
have made. At the same time, the neglected opportunity benefits present a devastating 
problem with the use of the precautionary principle. In the context of genetic engineering 
of food, this is very much the situation.
132 We can find the same problem when the 
precautionary principle is invoked to support bans on nonreproductive cloning.
133 For 
many people, the possible harms of cloning register more strongly than the potential 
therapeutic benefits that would eliminated by a ban on the practice. 
 
Loss aversion is closely associated with another cognitive finding: People are far 
more willing to tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar ones, even if they are statistically 
equivalent.
134 The risks associated with driving do not occasion a great deal of concern, 
even though tens of thousands of people die from motor vehicle accidents each year. The 
relevant risks are simply seen as part of life. By contrast, many people are quite 
concerned about risks that appear newer, such as the risks associated with genetically 
modified foods, newly introduced chemicals, nuclear power plants, and terrorism. Part of 
the reason for the asymmetry may be a belief that with new risks, we are in the domain of 
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available at http://www.npsas.org/GEPrecautionary.html 
133 See Testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, supra note. 
134 See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 140-143 (2000). uncertainty rather than risk, and hence it makes sense to be cautious when probabilities 
cannot be assigned. But the individual and social propensity to focus on new risks 
outruns that sensible propensity; it makes the precautionary principle operational by 
emphasizing a subset of the hazards actually involved. 
 
B.  The Mythical Benevolence of Nature 
 
Sometimes the precautionary principle operates by incorporating the belief that 
nature is essentially benign and that human intervention is likely to carry risks—as in the 
suggestion that the precautionary principle calls for stringent regulation of pesticides. 
This is a distinctive form of loss aversion. The idea is that any human intervention will 
create loss from the status quo, and that this loss should carry great weight, whereas the 
gains should be regarded with some suspicion or at least be taken as less weighty. Often 
lose aversion and a belief in nature’s benevolence march hand-in-hand: The status quo 
forms the baseline or reference state against which to assess deviations. Processes that 
interfere with nature seem, on the part of many, to be taken as troubling “degradation”—
whereas gains or improvements seem, other things being equal, far less significant. 
 
A belief in the benevolence of nature does seem to play a role in the operation of 
the precautionary principle, especially among those who see nature as harmonious or in 
balance. In fact many of those who endorse the principle seem to be especially concerned 
about new technologies. Certainly most people believe that natural chemicals are more 
safe than man-made chemicals.
135 (Most toxicologists disagree.
136) On this view, the 
principle calls for caution when people are intervening into the natural world. Here of 
course we can find considerable sense: Nature often consists of systems, and 
interventions into systems can cause a number of problems. New technologies can 
produce unintended bad effects, if only because they interfere with systems. But there is a 
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not be safe at all.
137  
 
Consider, for example, the idea that there is a “balance of nature.” According to a 
recent account, this idea is “not true.”
138 A scientific “revolution has shown that nature 
“is characterized by change, not constancy,”
139 and that “natural ecological systems are 
dynamic,” with desirable changes being “those induced through human action.”
140 In any 
case nature is often a realm of destruction, illness, killing, and death.
141 Hence the claim 
cannot be that human activity is necessarily or systematically more destructive than what 
nature does. Nor is it clear that natural products are comparatively safe.
142 Organic foods, 
favored by many people on grounds of safety and health and creating annual revenues of 
$4.5 billion in the United States alone, are “actually riskier to consume than food grown 
with synthetic chemicals.”
143 If the precautionary principle is seen to raise doubts about 
pesticides, but not about organic foods, it is probably because the health risks that come 
with departures from “nature” register as especially troublesome. Of course some of the 
most serious risks are a product of nature. Tobacco smoking kills 400,000 Americans 
each year; the precautionary principle might be (but has not been) directed against it. 
Nothing is more natural than exposure to sunlight, but such exposure is associated with 
skin cancer and other harms,
144 producing serious health problems that have not been the 
occasion for invoking the precautionary principle. 
 
To say this is not to resolve specific issues, which depend on complex questions 
of value and fact.
145 My only suggestion is that the false belief in a benevolence of nature 
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141 As elaborated in detail in John Stuart Mill, Nature, in Three Essays on Religion 3, 28-31 (1996). 
142 See Collman, supra note. 
143 Id. at 31. 
144 Id. at 199-201. 
145 For a helpful discussion of genetic modification of food and related issues, see McHughen, Pandora’s 
Picket Basket, supra note. help to explain why the precautionary principle is thought, quite incorrectly, to provide a 
great deal of analytical help. 
 
C.  The Availability Heuristic 
 
It is well-established that in thinking about risks, people rely on certain heuristics, 
or rules of thumb, which serve to simply their inquiry.
146 Of these rules of thumb, the 
availability heuristic is most important for purposes of understanding the law relating to 
risks.
147 The availability heuristic also helps illuminate the operation of the precautionary 
principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and why others will be 
neglected. For example, “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more 
numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable.”
148 
Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate the point with a simple study showing people a list 
of well-known people of both sexes, and asking them whether the list contains more 
names of women or more names of men. In lists in which the men were especially 
famous, people thought that the list had more names of men, whereas in lists in which the 
women were the more famous, people thought that the list had more names of women.
149 
 
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk 
that is familiar, like the risk associated with nuclear power, will be seen as more serious 
than a risk that is less familiar, like the risk associated with heat during the summer.
150 
But salience is important as well. “For example, the impact of seeing a house burning on 
the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading 
about a fire in the local paper.”
151 So too, recent events will have a greater impact than 
earlier ones. The point helps explain much risk-related behavior, including decisions to 
take precautions. For example, whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is 
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150 See Eric Klinenberg, supra note. 
151 Id. greatly affected by recent experiences.
152 If floods have not occurred in the immediate 
past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.
153 In the 
aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines 
steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.
154 Note that the use of the availability 
heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irrational.
155 Both insurance and precautionary 
measures can be expensive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be 
the best available guide to what will happen again. The problem is that the availability 
heuristic can lead to serious errors, in terms of both excessive fear and neglect. 
 
The availability heuristic helps to explains the operation of the precautionary 
principle for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is 
cognitively available, whereas other risks, including the risks associated with regulation 
itself, are not. For example, it is easy to see that arsenic is potentially dangerous; arsenic 
is well-known as a poison, forming the first word of a well-known movie about 
poisoning.
156 By contrast, there is a relatively complex mental operation in the judgment 
that arsenic regulation might lead people to use less safe alternatives. In many cases 
where the precautionary principle seems to offer guidance, the reason is that some of the 
relevant risks are available while others are barely visible. 
 
It is well-known that the availability heuristic affects risk judgments, and we can 
now appreciate the relationship between that heuristic and the operation of the 
precautionary principle. But to say the least, the availability heuristic does not operate in 
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156 Arsenic and Old Lace. a social vacuum.
157 What is readily “available” to some individuals, groups, cultures, and 
even nations will not be available to all. In part because of the use of the availability 
heuristic, the precautionary principle does not call for bans on nuclear power plants in 
France, which has not caused serious health risks in that nation despite its heavy reliance 
on nuclear energy.
158 By contrast, the Three Mile Island incident provoked intense 
concerns about nuclear power plants in the United States
159 and helped promote the 
widespread idea that a precautionary approach would discourage reliance on nuclear 
power. Many of those who favor gun control legislation have “available” a set of 
incidents in which such legislation would have avoided unnecessary deaths; many of 
those who reject such legislation are alert to incidents in which private gun ownership 
allowed people to fend off criminal violence.
160 Much remains to be done to clarify the 
relationship between the availability heuristic and social interactions, including the 
operations of the media and political officials. For present purposes, the key point is that 
the availability heuristic often underwrites the use of the precautionary principle, by 
suggesting the importance of taking precautions against some, but hardly all, of the risks 
involved. 
 
D. Probability  Neglect 
 
The availability heuristic can produce an inaccurate assessment of probability. 
But sometimes people will attempt little assessment of probability at all, especially when 
strong emotions are involved.
 161 In such cases, large-scale variations in probabilities will 
matter little—even when those variations unquestionably should matter. The point 
applies to hope as well as fear; vivid images of good outcomes will crowd out 
consideration of probability too.
162 Lotteries are successful partly for this reason.
163 But 
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163 See Phillip Cook, Selling Hope (1993). for purposes of applying the precautionary principle, the topic is fear rather than hope. I 
suggest that sometimes the precautionary principle becomes workable because the issue 
of probability is neglected, and people focus on one emotionally gripping outcome 
among a large set of possibilities. 
 
Probability neglect has received its clearest empirical confirmation in a striking 
study of people’s willingness to pay to avoid electric shocks.
164 The central purpose of 
the study was to test the relevance of probability in “affect rich” decisions. One 
experiment investigated whether varying the probability of harm would matter more, or 
less, in settings that trigger strong emotions than in settings that seem relatively emotion-
free. In the “strong emotion” setting, participants were asked to imagine that they would 
participate in an experiment involving some chance of a “short, painful, but not 
dangerous electric shock.”
165 In the relatively emotion-free setting, participants were told 
that the experiment entailed some chance of a $20 penalty. Participants were asked to say 
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid participating in the relevant experiment. 
Some participants were told that there was a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome 
(either the $20 loss or the electric shock); others were told that the chance was 99%; and 
still others were told that the chance was 100%.  
 
The central result was that variations in probability affected those facing the 
relatively emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than they affected people facing 
the more emotionally evocative outcome of an electric shock.
166 For the cash penalty, the 
difference between the median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a 
99% chance was predictably large and indeed consistent with the standard model: $1 to 
avoid a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance.
167 For the electric shock, by contrast, 
the difference in probability made little difference to median willingness to pay: $7 to 
avoid a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance!
168 Apparently people will pay a 
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Psychology of Probability Weighting, supra, at 176-88.  
165 Id. at 181. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. significant amount to avoid a small probability of a hazard that is affectively-laden—and 
the amount that they will pay will not vary greatly with changes in probability. The point 
explains “why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear power and exposure to 
extremely small amounts of toxic chemicals fail to recede in response to information 
about the very small probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards.”
169  
 
It should be easy to the connection between probability neglect and the 
precautionary principle. If probabilities are neglected, especially when emotions are 
engaged, then the principle will operate through excessive public concern with certain 
low-probability hazards. Return to the contrast between deaths from heat waves and 
deaths from airplane crashes.
170 The latter trigger far more intense public attention, in 
part because of the availability heuristic, but in part because for some people, the 
outcome itself has such salience, and the probability much less so. In the context of 
genetic modification of food and global warming, the same phenomenon is at work, 
leading people to think that the precautionary principle, simply applied, calls for 
aggressive regulatory controls. Note that I am not urging that such controls are a mistake; 
in the context of global warming, they seem to be warranted by the facts. My claim is 
only that the precautionary principle appears to give guidance in part because the issue of 
probability is neglected.  
 
For purposes of understanding the operation of the precautionary principle, it is 
important to see that visualization or imagery matters a great deal to people’s reactions to 
risks.
171 When an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly 
concerned about a risk, holding probability constant.
172 Consider the fact that when 
people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses resulting from 
“terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight 
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172 See Loewenstein et al., supra, at 275-76. insurance from all causes.
173 The evident explanation for this peculiar result is that the 
word “terrorism” evokes vivid images of disaster, thus crowding out probability 
judgments. Note also that when people discuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises 
even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the 
likelihood of harm really is infinitesmal.
174 The reason is that the discussion makes it 
easier to visualize the risk and hence to fear it.  
 
Note that probability neglect does not involve the availability heuristic. That 
heuristic leads not to neglect probability, but to answer the question of probability by 
substituting a hard question (what is the statistical risk?) with an easy question (do salient 
examples readily come to mind?).
175 My point here is not that visualization makes an 
event seem more probable (though this is also often true), but that visualization makes the 
issue of probability less relevant or even irrelevant. In theory, the distinction between use 
of the availability heuristic and probability neglect should not be obscure. In practice, of 
course, it will often be hard to know whether the availability heuristic or probability 
neglect is driving behavior. 
 
The most sensible conclusion is that with respect to risks of injury of harm, vivid 
images and concrete pictures of disaster can “crowd out” other kinds of thoughts, 
including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is really small. “If someone is 
predisposed to be worried, degrees of unlikeliness seem to provide no comfort, unless 
one can prove that harm is absolutely impossible, which itself is not possible.”
176 
Probability neglect, I suggest, often makes the precautionary principle seem sensible and 
workable. Indeed, the precautionary principle often embodies a form of probability 
neglect. When people focus on highly speculative risks associated with certain risks, it is 
often because of intense emotional reactions that make those risks, and not relevant 
others, stand out from the background. In many cases, probability neglect and loss 
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176 See Weingart, supra note 1, at 362. aversion march hand-in-hand. Potential losses, from the status quo, often trigger intense 
emotions, as potential gains do not; and when the precautionary principle is operating, the 
low-probability losses have far more salience than they deserve.
177 
 
Nor is the problem of probability neglect foreign to law. In many contexts, law 
seems to be a response, in part, to fear of bad outcomes without close attention to the 
question of probability—along one dimension, the precautionary principle in action.
178 
The European Community’s ban on meat products treated with hormones has raised 
large-scale issues about the role of public fear in risk regulation.
179 The Appellate Body 
of the World Trade Organization ruled
180 that the ban ran afoul of Article 5.1 of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),
181 which requires 
members of the WTO to justify all health and safety regulations by reference to scientific 
risk assessments.
182 In this way, the Appellate Body rejected the EC’s effort to defend 
itself in part by reference to consumer fears about the safety of beef treated with 
hormones.
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The fourth point is, in a way, the largest. My suggestion is that much of the time, 
and with respect to risks, people neglect the systemic effect of one-shot interventions. 
They tend to assume that a change in a social situation would alter the part at issue, but 
without altering other parts. System neglect, thus understood, includes the general 
phenomenon of tradeoff neglect, by which people fail to see the frequent need to way 
competing variables against one another.
185 But tradeoff neglect is only part of what is 
involved here. When the precautionary principle gives guidance, and when it goes wrong, 
it is often because those who use it are falling victim to system neglect. 
 
The clearest evidence comes from the German psychologist Dietrich Dorner, who 
has designed some fascinating experiments to see whether people can reduce social 
risks.
186 Dorner’s experiments are run via computer. Participants are asked to reduce risks 
faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world. The risks may involve pollution, 
poverty, poor medical care, inadequate fertilization of crops, sick cattle, insufficient 
water, or excessive hunting and fishing. Through the magic of the computer, many policy 
initiatives are available—improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling more 
wells). Participants are able to choose among them. Once particular initiatives are chosen, 
the computer projects, over short periods and then over decades, what is likely to happen 
in the region.  
 
In these experiments, success is entirely possible. Some initiatives will actually 
make for effective and enduring improvements. But many of the participants—even the 
most educated and professional—produce calamities. They do so because they fixate on 
isolated problems and do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular 
interventions. For example, they may appreciate the importance of increasing the number 
of cattle, but once they do that, they create a serious risk of overgrazing, and they fail to 
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187 They may understand full well the value of drilling more wells 
to provide water, but they do not anticipate the energy and environmental effects of the 
drilling, which then endangers the food supply. Only the rare participant is able to see a 
number of steps down the road—to understand the multiple effects of one-shot 
interventions into the system, and to assess a wide range of consequences from those 
interventions. The successful participants seem to take small, reversible steps, or to see 
the full set of effects at once, and thus to protect themselves against major blunders. 




How would the precautionary principle operate if invoked in Dorner’s 
experiments? It should be easy to see that while the weaker version might provide some 
assistance, the stronger versions offer no help at all. There are simply too many risks 
against which one might take precautions. Precautions cannot be taken against all risks, 
not for the important but less interesting reason that resources are limited, but simply 
because efforts to redress any set of risks might produce risks of their own. The real 
world of risk regulation offers many analogues.
189 To the extent that the precautionary 
principle appears to offer guidance, it is often because adverse systemic effects, and the 
need to take precautions against them, are simply being neglected.  
 
Howard Margolis has used a related point to explain why experts have different 
risk judgments from ordinary people, and he has done so in a particular effort to explain 
why and when ordinary people will think, “Better safe than sorry.”
190 Margolis thus 
offers some cognitive foundations for the precautionary principle, without explicitly 
discussing the idea. Margolis’ goal is to cast light on some apparent anomalies in 
ordinary thinking about risks: Why do people believe that small risks from pesticides 
should be regulated, if comparatively small risks from X-rays are quite tolerable? Why 
are people so concerned about the risks of nuclear power, when experts tend to believe 
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190 See Margolis, supra note. that the risks are quite low—lower, in fact, than the risks from competing energy sources, 
such as coal-fired power plants, which produce relatively little public objection?  
 
Margolis suggests that people are sometimes subject to a kind of optical illusion, 
in which they see the harms associated with some activity or process, but fail to see the 
benefits. If so, they will tend to think, “better safe they sorry.”
191 If not, they will see 
some “fungibility” between both harms and benefits, and engage in the kind of tradeoff 
analysis that is more typical for experts.
192 Margolis offers a nice example to support this 
suggestion.
193 The removal of asbestos from schools in New York City was initially quite 
popular, indeed demanded by parents, even though experts believed that the risks were 
statistically small. (As it happens, the risk of a child getting cancer from asbestos 
insulation was about 1/3 the risk of being struck by lightning.) But when it emerged that 
the removal would cause schools to be closed for a period of weeks, and when the closing 
caused parents to become greatly inconvenienced, parental attitudes turned right around, 
and asbestos removal seemed like a really bad idea. When the costs of the removal came 
on-screen, parents thought much more like experts, and the risks of asbestos seemed well 
worth tolerating: Statistically small, and on balance worth incurring. The precautionary 
principle often operates because of the visibility of only one side of the ledger, so that 
people think that parents in advance of asbestos removal, seeing the possibility of hazard 
without confronting the problems introducing by reducing it. 
 
For an especially vivid example, consider the apparent views of Americans in the 
late 1990s. About 63 percent of Americans agreed with the statement: “Protecting the 
environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high and 
continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost.”
194 In the same 
general vein, 59 percent supported the Kyoto Treaty on global warming, with only 21 
percent opposed.
195 But in the same period, 52 percent of Americans said that they would 
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195 Id. refuse to support the Kyoto Treaty on global warming if “it would cost an extra $50 per 
month for an average American household.”
196 In fact only 11 percent of Americans 
would support the Kyoto Treaty if the monthly expense were $100 or more.
197 How can 
we explain strong majority support for “environmental improvements . . . regardless of 
cost” and strong majority rejection of environmental improvements when the cost if 
high? The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in fact, willing to spend an infinite 
amount for environmental improvements, and that when the costs are squarely placed “on 
screen,” people begin to weigh both costs and benefits. 
 
There are many other examples. People seem quite concerned about the risks 
associated with dioxin, a real candidate for use of the precautionary principle, but far less 
concerned about the statistically equivalent risks associated with aflatoxin, a carcinogen 
found in peanut butter.
198 When aflatoxin does not trigger public concern, a large part of 
the reason is that the burdens of banning aflatoxin seem high and indeed intolerable; too 
many people would object to heavy regulation of peanut butter, a staple of school lunches 
and many diets for generations. In this light it is both mildly counterintuitive and 
reasonable, for example, to predict that people would be willing to pay less, in terms of 
dollars and waiting time, to reduce low-probability risks of an airplane disaster if they are 
frequent travellers. An intriguing study finds exactly that effect.
199 I t  i s  a l s o  s a f e  t o  
predict that if people were told, by a reliable source, that eliminating pesticides would 
lead to serious health problems—for example, because pesticide-free fruits and 
vegetables carried special dangers
200—the perceived risk of pesticides would decline 
dramatically, and it would be difficult to invoke the precautionary principle as a basis for 
stringent regulation of pesticides.
201 Indeed I predict that if people were informed that 
eliminating pesticides would lead to a significant cost in the price of applies and oranges, 
the perceived risk would go down as well.
202 
                                                 
196 Id. at Box 16.  
197 Id.  
198 Id. at 136-37. 
199 See Matthew Harrington (unpublished manuscript). 
200 See the discussion of organic food in McHughen, supra note, at 232-37. 
201 Carolyn Raffensperger, The Precautionary Principle as Forecaring: Hopeful Work for the Environmental 
Health Movement (2000), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/forecaring.html 
202 For evidence of the general phenomenon, see Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2000).  
The conclusion is that the precautionary principle often seems helpful because 
analysts are focussing on the “target” risk, and not on the systemic, risk-related effects of 
being precautionary, or even on the risk-related consequences of risk reduction. Rational 
regulators, of course, think about systems, not snapshots.
203 And once we see that risks 
are inevitably parts of systems, the precautionary principle will become far less helpful. 
 
V. Toward Wider Viewscreens 
 
In this Article I have argued not that the precautionary principle leads in the 
wrong directions, but that if it is taken for all that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. 
The reason is that risks of one kind or another are on all sides of regulatory choices, and 
it is therefore impossible, in most real-world cases, to avoid running afoul of the 
principle. Frequently risk regulation creates a (speculative) risk from substitute risks or 
from foregone risk-reduction opportunities. And because of the (speculative) mortality 
and morbidity effects of costly regulation, any regulation, if it is costly, threatens to run 
afoul of the precautionary principle. We have seen that both regulation and nonregulation 
seem to be forbidden in cases involving nuclear power, arsenic, global warming, and 
genetic modification of food. The precautionary principle seems to offer guidance only 
because people blind themselves to certain aspects of the risk situation, focusing on a 
mere subset of the hazards that are at stake. 
 
To some extent, those who endorse the precautionary principle seem to be 
responding to salutary political or moral motivations that the principle might be thought 
to embody. Well-organized private groups sometimes demand conclusive proof of harm 
                                                 
203 There might seem to be some tension between the plea for wide viewscreens and my (qualified) 
argument for a form of judicial minimalism, in Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). But there is 
no tension. Minimalism is a form of incrementalism, arguing on behalf of “small steps” in part because of 
the risk that large-scale interventions into systems will have unanticipated adverse consequences. See id. at 
52-53. Indeed, Dorner himself suggests that small steps are a desirable approach to the risk of system 
neglect. See The Logic of Failure, supra, at 166-81. By endorsing a wide viewscreen, I do not mean to 
challenge small steps, but instead to urge that in taking any step at all, officials should look at the range of 
likely consequences. Of course it is possible that a full assessment of such consequences will be beyond 
existing capacities. In such cases simplifying devices might be helpful. See Goklany, supra note, at 9-10, 
for some suggestions.  as a precondition for regulation; the demand should be firmly resisted, because a 
probability of harm is, under many circumstances, a sufficient reason to act. Both 
individuals and societies have a tendency to neglect the future; the precautionary 
principle might be understood as a warning against that form of neglect. There are 
extremely good reasons to incorporate distributional considerations into risk regulation, 
and the precautionary principle seems, some of the time, to be a way to protect the most 
disadvantaged against risks of illness, accident, and death. Sometimes people try to 
reduce dissonance by thinking that actual risks are trivial; the precautionary principle 
might work as a helpful counterweight to this mechanism. The problem is that the 
precautionary principle, as applied, is a crude and sometimes perverse way to promote 
these various goals, not least because it might be, and has been, urged in situations in 
which the principle threatens to injure future generations and to harm rather than to help 
those who are most disadvantaged. 
 
I have also urged that the precautionary principle can be made operational only 
because of identifiable cognitive mechanisms. Often loss aversion is at work. The 
benefits of certain practices are less salient than the costs, simply because the costs 
would, along an important dimension, represent a deterioration from the status quo. 
When loss aversion is involved, it might be thought, wrongly, that natural processes are 
always safer, and better for the environment, than processes that involve human 
intervention. Sometimes the precautionary principle works by exploiting the availability 
heuristic, because the risks that matter are cognitively accessible, whereas the risks that 
are ignored are far less so. Frequently the precautionary principle is underwritten by 
probability neglect. Highly speculative harms are emphasized by those who focus on the 
badness of the relevant outcomes, rather than the likelihood that they will occur. Most 
generally, the precautionary principle sometimes gives an illusion of guidance because 
people focus on the immediate risk while disregarding the systemic effects of one-shot 
interventions, even though those interventions can give rise to risks of their own. 
 
I have not suggested any particular substitute for the precautionary principle.  But I do not endorse the suggestion of Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist with a 
special interest in risk regulation, who also rejects the precautionary principle.
204 In 
Wildavsky’s view, the notion of “precaution” should be abandoned and replaced with a 
principle of “resilience,” based on an understanding that nature, and society, are quite 
able to incorporate even strong shocks, and that the ultimate dangers are therefore smaller 
than we are likely to fear. It would follow from the “resilience” principle that a nation 
should be less concerned than it now is with the risks associated with (for example) 
arsenic, global warming, and destruction of the ozone layer. Unfortunately, the principle 
of “resilience” is no better than that of “precaution.” Some systems are resilient, but 
many are not. Whether an ecosystem, or a society, is “resilent” cannot be decided in the 
abstract. In any case resilience is a matter of degree. Everything depends on the facts. The 
“resilience principle” should be understood as a heuristic, one that favors inaction in the 
face of possibly damaging technological change. Like most heuristics, the resilience 




A better approach would acknowledge that a wide variety of adverse effects may 
come from inaction, regulation, and everything between. Such an approach would 
attempt to consider all of those adverse effects, not simply a subset.
206 When existing 
knowledge does not allow clear assessments of the full range of adverse effects, such an 
approach would develop simplifying devices, helping to show the appropriate course of 
action in the face of uncertainty.
207 Such an approach would pursue distributional goals 
                                                 
204 See Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues 433 
(1995). 
205 Cf. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
Judgment and Decision Making: A Interdisciplinary Reader 38, 55 (Hal Arkes and Kenneth Hammond). 
(emphasizing that heuristic can lead to systematic mistakes). The resilience principle might well be taken as 
a reflection of optimistic bias. See Neil Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
Personality and Soc Psych. 806 (1980); Shelly Taylor, Positive Illusions (1991). 
206 See Wiener, supra note; Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (forthcoming 2002). 
207 See Goklany, supra note, at 9-10. Instead of advocating full-fledged balancing of relevant variables, 
Goklany proposes that regulators look at a list of criteria, including “the human mortality criterion” 
(valuing human life over that of members of other species), “the immediacy criterion” (giving priority to 
immediate threats), “the uncertainty criterion” (giving priority to risks with a higher probability of 
occurring), and “the irreversibility criterion” (giving priority to risks that are likely to be permanent or 
persistent). Some of these criteria seem to me doubtful; a less immediate threat might, for example, deserve 
priority if its magnitude so suggests, and it is unclear that a small number of human lives deserve priority directly by, for example, requiring wealthy countries, major contributors to the problem 
of global warming, to pay poor countries to reduce greenhouse gases or to prepare 
themselves for the relevant risks. And such an approach would attempt to counteract, 
rather than to embody, the various cognitive limitations that people face in thinking about 
risks. An appreciation of the difficulties with the precautionary principle suggests the 
importance of overcoming cognitive limitations by ensuring that people have a full, 
rather than limited, sense of what is at stake. The result should be to help with cognitive 
distortions and to produce sensible priority-setting. An effort to produce a fair accounting 
of the universe of dangers should also help to diminish the danger of interest-group 
manipulation.  
 
To be sure, public alarm, even if ill-informed, is itself a harm, and it is likely to 
lead to additional harms, perhaps in the form of large-scale “ripple effects.”
208 A sensible 
approach to risk will attempt to reduce public fear even if it is baseless. My goal here has 
been not to deny that point, but to explain the otherwise puzzling appeal of the 
precautionary principle and to isolate the strategies that help make it operational. At the 
individual level, these strategies are hardly senseless, especially for people who lack 
much information or who do the best they can by focussing on only one aspect of the 
situation at hand.
209 But for governments, the precautionary principle is not sensible, for 
the simple reason that once the viewscreen is widened, it become clear that the principle 
provides no guidance at all. A rational system of risk regulation certainly takes 







                                                                                                                                                 
over a large number of lives of members of other species. But Goklany is correct to seek an approach that 
helps in making decisions under uncertainty. Wiener, supra note, offers some valuable suggestions, 
involving in partcular the need to ensure “risk-superior moves,” meaning approaches that reduce overall 
risks. (Unpublished manuscript at 16.) The problem with this approach is that sometimes we will lack 
sufficient information to identify such moves, because regulation must proceed in the face of uncertainty 
rather than risk. See above.  
208 See the discussion of the social amplification of risk in Slovic, supra note. 
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